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we ﬁnd that managerial power determines the strength of this asymmetry.
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In recent years, anecdotal evidence from China’s securities markets suggests changing standards of execu-
tive compensation. In 2008, China Southern (Stock code: 600029) suﬀered a huge loss of 5 billion yuan, whichurnal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City University of
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sation for executives1 of China Southern jumped by 50%.2 In 2010, CIMC (Stock code: 000039) earned a net
proﬁt of 3 billion yuan, an increase of 213%, of which 76.84 million yuan was proﬁt from changes in the fair
value (PCFV) of derivative ﬁnancial instruments. The compensation to CIMC’s executives soared nearly 10-
fold.3 According to annual ﬁnancial reports for 2008, Air China (Stock code: 601111) and China Eastern
(Stock code: 600115) incurred losses of 7.9 million yuan and 4.2 million yuan, respectively, of which losses
from crude oil swaps accounted for 78.4% in the case of Air China and 42.2% in the case of China Eastern.
As a result, the total compensation of the three highest-paid executives in these companies decreased by only
50,000 yuan for Air China executives and 73,000 yuan for China Eastern executives. These cases indicate that
executive compensation tends to (1) increase far more than growth in earnings from PCFV, (2) increase
despite LCFV and (3) change little despite huge losses from CFV.
According to optimal contracting theory, compensation contracts are eﬀective in solving the agency prob-
lem between stockholders and managers. Given that a compensation contract is eﬀective, executive compen-
sation should be directly related to corporate performance. Performance is always designed as the core
element of executive compensation contracts. However, contrary to common expectations, levels of executive
compensation have virtually nothing to do with corporate performance in practice and the core inﬂuence of
performance on executive compensation tends to disappear. According to an investigation from the Informa-
tion Centre of Guangdong Province, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) pay high salaries to executives as rewards
for their individual contributions and millions of yuan ﬂow into the executives’ pockets regardless of their
ﬁrms’ continuous losses.4 In addition, scholars have found that perfect contracts do not exist and that the
formulation, implementation and eﬃciency of contracts are controlled by managerial power (Hambrick
and Finkelstein, 1995; Core et al., 1999; Bebchuk et al., 2002; Duﬀhues and Kabir, 2008; Cheng and
Indjejikian, 2009). In accordance with rational assumptions about economic self-interest, it is not surprising
that executives manipulate compensation contracts. The control of operating returns by executives is evident
in theoretical explanations of managerial power and in studies providing empirical evidence (Cyert et al., 2002;
Garvey and Milbourn, 2006; Gopalan et al., 2008; Morse et al., 2008; Fahlenbrach, 2009). China’s economic
system provides fertile soil for breeding managerial power. Numerous empirical studies provide evidence that
managerial power does inﬂuence executive compensation in China’s listed companies (Zhang and Shi, 2005;
Lu, 2008; Lyu and Zhao, 2008; Quan et al., 2010).
In 2006, fair value was introduced into the new accounting standards in China and the structure of account-
ing performance has changed since CFV became an item of operating income. As a basis for compensation
evaluation, CFV cannot be separated from the compensation evaluation system. Executives should be respon-
sible for investment decisions that cause CFV. However, because of the asymmetric sensitivity of compensa-
tion to performance (Gaver and Gaver, 1998; Dorﬀ, 2005; Garvey and Milbourn, 2006; Fang, 2009; Xu and
Zeng, 2010), executive compensation displays its own characteristic of asymmetric sensitivity to CFV. Asym-
metric sensitivity explains the diﬀerent eﬀects of CFV on executive compensation in the above-mentioned
anecdotal cases. In dealing with this issue, the initial problem is to understand where the power of executives
to control compensation comes from. What factors determine the strength of this asymmetric sensitivity in
executive compensation? Does managerial power play a role in the asymmetric sensitivity of executive com-
pensation to CFV?
Our sample consists of Chinese ﬁrms listed as A-share companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Securities
Exchanges between 2007 and 2009. We analyze the eﬀects of CFV on executive compensation from the view-
point of contracting theory and attempt to explain the observed eﬀects in reference to the theory of managerial
power. We draw the following conclusions: (1) as a new item of performance in the income statement, CFV is
positively related to executive compensation; (2) the sensitivity of executive compensation is asymmetric to
CFV in that executive pay rises higher due to PCFV than it declines due to LCFV; and (3) the greater the
managerial power, the more asymmetric the sensitivity of executive compensation is to CFV.1 In this paper, compensation refers only to monetary compensation reported in company annual ﬁnancial statements.
2 http://www.yrdnet.com/News/Detail-9906.aspx, April 15, 2009.
3 http://ﬁnance.cn.yahoo.com/mark/stocknews, March 23, 2011.
4 Haining Feng, Why is SASAC unable to control self-dealing in executive compensation? China Economic Times, July 17, 2008.
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CFV on executive compensation. Previous studies have paid more attention to the sensitivity of executive
compensation to PCFV (Hou and Jin, 2010; Xu and Zeng, 2010) and the sensitivity of executive compensation
to LCFV is less commonly observed. We ﬁnd a positive relationship between executive compensation and
CFV, whether those changes involve proﬁts or losses. This ﬁnding veriﬁes the potential usefulness of contracts
for controlling executive compensation in relation to CFV. In other words, the compensation contract is a
valid tool to some extent. Second, we provide evidence to conﬁrm the asymmetric sensitivity of executive com-
pensation to CFV. Third, we investigate both the asymmetric sensitivity and the eﬀects of managerial power
on levels of executive compensation. This investigation makes contributions to two research streams. We use
the theory of managerial power to explain the asymmetric sensitivity of executive compensation to CFV and
we ﬁnd new empirical evidence concerning the eﬀects that managerial power has on compensation, while pro-
viding a reasonable explanation for compensation stickiness.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the institutional background and literature
review. Section 3 provides the theoretical analysis and develops testable hypotheses. Section 4 outlines the
research design, including the sample selection, data sources, variable deﬁnitions and descriptive statistics.
Section 5 provides the empirical results and Section 6 draws conclusions.
2. Institutional background and literature review
2.1. Institutional background
2.1.1. SOE reform and executive compensation
Since the market-oriented enterprise reform in 1978, operating performance has been taken into consider-
ation by decision makers when designing executive compensation contracts. Along with the SOE shareholding
system reform, the launching of the split share structure reform and the development of capital markets, the
structure of executive compensation in SOEs underwent several major institutional transitions. In 1984, The
CPC Central Committee’s Decision on the Reform of the Economic System proposed the principle of distribu-
tion according to work. In 1986, Certain Provisions of the State Council on Deepening the Reform of Enterprises
to Enhance the Vitality of Enterprises advanced a proposal that the personal salaries of managerial operators
could be one to three times higher than those of staﬀ and workers. In 1992, the Ministry of Labor and the
Economic and Trade Oﬃce of the State Council issued a new rule named To Improve Income Allocation of
SOE Operators, which for the ﬁrst time required that managers’ salaries be linked to their work performance.
In 1995, the State-owned Assets Administration Bureau (which is in charge of assessing, maintaining and
increasing the value of state-owned assets) claimed that managers’ salaries must be connected to their perfor-
mance assessments. In 2003, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC)
issued the Interim Measures for the Performance Evaluation of the Person in Charge of the Central Enterprises,
which both encouraged and constrained enterprise supervisors in the design of incentive contracts and assess-
ments of operating performance. In 2004, the SASAC further issued the Interim Measures for the Compensa-
tion Management of Central Enterprise Principle, specifying that compensation should follow a central
enterprise principle and be comprised of basic pay, long-term incentive pay and performance pay, with per-
formance pay determined by operating performance. In 2009, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social
Security issued its Guidance to Further Regulate the Compensation Management of Central Enterprise Principle.
This policy further regulated the incentive mechanism in pay levels, pay structures, post-consumption, man-
agement and oversight, and organization and implementation. The evolving development of the executive
compensation system shows that policy governing executive pay has been designed increasingly in relation
to operating performance. However, it cannot be ignored that the gradually liberalized standards for executive
compensation are progressively controlled by managers themselves, resulting in astronomical salaries due to
state ownership and insider control.
2.1.2. Introduction of fair value into new accounting standards and CFV as a new item of income
The new enterprise accounting standard system was issued by the Ministry of Finance on February 15, 2006
and was implemented for listed companies starting January 1, 2007. As the new accounting standard
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item for reporting proﬁts or losses originating from changes in the fair value of assets or liabilities. According
to the new standards, these changes in fair value should be reported as gains or losses in the current period’s
income statement. Except in the case of ﬁnancial enterprises, proﬁts and losses from changes in fair value must
be reported on transactions involving the trading of ﬁnancial assets or liabilities, derivative ﬁnancial instru-
ments and investment property. The introduction of fair value into the new accounting standards included
setting-up a new item in the income statement, distinguishing investment gains or losses with diﬀerent levels
of risk, improving the relevance of accounting information and enabling better decision-making by investors
or managers. However, whether these changes in accounting standards aﬀect executive compensation is still an
open question.2.2. Literature review
Many scholars have explored the issues of CFV, executive compensation and managerial power. We cat-
egorize these studies into three topics.2.2.1. CFV and executive compensation
From the perspective of contracting theory, Hou and Jin (2010) study the inﬂuence of CFV on executive
compensation after the implementation of the new accounting standards. They ﬁnd that both PCFV and
LCFV tend to increase executive pay levels. Zhou et al. (2010) ﬁnd that CEOs and chairmen are responsible
for gains or losses from short-term investment property, but their salaries are insensitive to CFV. Also, CFOs
are in charge of funding operations and their compensation is positively sensitive to CFV. Xu and Zeng (2010)
document that PCFV has a positive eﬀect on executive compensation and that the incentive eﬀects are signif-
icantly higher than for other earnings items. LCFV, however, is not signiﬁcantly sensitive to executive com-
pensation. They conﬁrm that an asymmetric sensitivity of compensation to performance does exist in A-share
listed Chinese companies. In other words, irrational incentives to proﬁt from PCFV contrast with motivations
to avoid punishment for LCFV. Zhang et al. (2011) ﬁnd that PCFV (or LCFV) entering the income statement
and directly credited into capital surplus is positively related (or not relevant) to changes in executive compen-
sation. They conclude that contracts for executive compensation in listed Chinese companies fail to properly
deal with changes in fair value.2.2.2. Sensitivity of executive compensation to performance and executive compensation stickiness
According to agency theory, compensation is naturally related to performance. However, scholars disagree
over the nature of this relationship. Taussings and Baker (1925) were among the ﬁrst to focus on this relation-
ship and they ﬁnd little relationship between compensation and performance. Figler and Lutz (1991) and Tosi
et al. (2000) ﬁnd a weak relationship between the two. The opposite conclusion is drawn by McGuire et al.
(1962), Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Jensen and Murphy (1990) and George and Hall (1998). Conyon
(2006) argues that the sensitivity of executive compensation to performance has increased year by year in
the United States. However, domestic research in China has not reached such a consensus on this matter.
Zhang et al. (2003), Du and Wang (2007), Lu (2008) and Jiang (2008) all ﬁnd evidence that performance
and compensation are signiﬁcantly related. Li (2000), Wei (2000) and Chen and Liu (2003), however, provide
evidence of a non-signiﬁcant relationship between compensation and performance.
The notion that executive compensation is sensitive to performance does not necessarily mean that changes
in performance bring changes of the same magnitude in compensation. The inﬂuence of performance on
compensation diﬀers in situations of performance growth or decline. In other words, compensation is sticky.
Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Sun and Liu (2004) ﬁnd that executives are reluctant to reduce their pay for
reasons of personal reputation and career advancement. Gaver and Gaver (1998) ﬁnd that CEO pay is signif-
icantly related to rises in operating proﬁts and non-recurring proﬁts, but it does not fall due to operating losses
or non-recurring losses. Dorﬀ (2005) also ﬁnds that executive compensation is more sensitive to positive earn-
ings performance than to ﬁnancial losses, which means that compensation is only inﬂuenced by good perfor-
mance. Fang (2009) provides further evidence of the asymmetries in the sensitivity of executive compensation
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listed companies.
2.2.3. Managerial power and executive compensation
Since Bebchuk et al. (2002) presented their theory of managerial power, this understanding has played an
important role in explaining executive compensation levels, the sensitivity of compensation to performance,
the changing structure of compensation and the evaluation of operating performance (Lu and Wei, 2008).
Otten (2008) selects 1393 compensation contracts from 451 companies distributed in 17 countries between
2001 and 2004. The results document that the theory of managerial power is universally applicable. A signif-
icant body of empirical research documents the eﬀects of managerial power on executive compensation.
Hambrick and Finkelstein (1995) ﬁnd that CEO pay grows faster in enterprises controlled by management.
Core et al. (1999) ﬁnd that managerial power is stronger and CEO pay is higher in enterprises with large-sized
boards and with outside directors who are mostly appointed by the CEO. Bebchuk et al. (2002) present
evidence that the stronger the managerial power, the stronger the managers’ ability to gain from rents and
control their own salaries. Cyert et al. (2002) ﬁnd that the pay of CEOs who serve as chairmen of the board
is 20–40% higher than that of other CEOs. Duﬀhues and Kabir (2008) document that executives control their
own pay through managerial power. Fahlenbrach (2009) ﬁnds that increases in the managerial power of CEOs
signiﬁcantly improve their pay. Cheng and Indjejikian (2009) ﬁnd that CEOs exert a strong inﬂuence in formu-
lating their compensation contracts and are capable of inﬂuencing their boards on compensation assessment.
In the context of China, many domestic scholars have studied the inﬂuence of managerial power on exec-
utive compensation in listed companies, taking account of China’s particular institutional background. Pan
and Tong (2005) ﬁnd that top managers of Chinese public companies design their own compensation contracts
and assess their own performance. Zhang and Shi (2005) ﬁnd that the proportion of independent directors on
the board, the establishment of a compensation committee and the duality of chairman and CEO roles all have
signiﬁcantly positive eﬀects on executive pay levels. Lu (2008) ﬁnds that managerial power is positively related
to executive pay. Lyu and Zhao (2008) ﬁnd that SOE managers with strong executive powers design their own
incentive portfolios and obtain higher pay largely through bonuses. In contrast, managers with weaker power
are more concerned about their salaries and manipulate earnings (or ﬁctitious proﬁts) to satisfy the compen-
sation assessment requirements. Quan et al. (2010) examine SEOs and ﬁnd that managers with increasing
power are inclined to obtain performance pay through earnings management, which means that the stronger
the managerial power, the more sensitive compensation is to manipulated performance.
3. Theoretical analysis and hypothesis development
The separation of ownership and control in modern enterprises results in an agency problem. According to
agency theory, the principal assigns tasks to the agent, whose objective function is diﬀerent from that of the
principal. This diﬀerence in functions leads agents to defend their interests against those of the principals. The
determination of executive compensation is one such agency problem in which optimal contracting theory
holds. Incentive contracts are an eﬀective way to solve the agency problem. A favorably designed executive
compensation contract is supposed to be an eﬀective mechanism to make the goals of both managers and
stockholders compatible and to reduce agency costs. A well-functioning contract can also prevent executives
from pursuing goals detrimental to shareholders’ goal of value maximization, as such deviation would be an
example of the agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Managerial compen-
sation and corporate performance are connected through an eﬀective contracting arrangement. The more sen-
sitive executive compensation is to corporate performance, the more closely aligned executive interests are
with the interests of stockholders. The best way of designing a contract is to pay according to performance
(Jenson and Murphy, 1990). In an optimal contract, executive compensation is linearly related to performance
(Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). Performance measured by audited earnings may reduce the noise caused by
market volatility in determining executive compensation (Lambert and Larcker, 1987; Sloan, 1993), as earn-
ings are more sensitive and accurate than market performance (Xu and Zeng, 2010). Earnings better reﬂect
management’s ﬁduciary obligation and operating eﬃciency (Natarajan, 1996) and thus should be the basis
of performance evaluation.
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performance (Hou and Jin, 2010). These standards also enhance the eﬀectiveness of measuring executive com-
pensation against accounting performance. According to the new standards, CFV is directly introduced into
operating income as an earnings item, which leads to a great change in the structure of accounting and makes
CFV an important element aﬀecting performance reports. The investment and management of ﬁnancial assets
and investment property are the main contributors to CFV. Despite being theoretically determined by the
market, CFV is in fact decided by managers, who decide on the options of purchasing, holding or selling ﬁnan-
cial assets. It is undeniable that shareholder wealth is directly aﬀected by CFV arising from past decisions by
the managers. As optimal contracting theory claims, eﬀective contracts must make the managers’ ﬁnancial
results and their pay connected to the highest degree possible. Hence, we suggest that CFV is positively related
to executive compensation and propose the ﬁrst hypothesis.
H1. Executive compensation is positively related to CFV.Although compensation contracts are theoretically based on optimal contracting theory and are an ideal
method for solving the agency problem between stockholders and managers, in reality the contract is often
far from perfect. Three preconditions are necessary to ensure that optimal contracting theory works well.
These include eﬀective negotiation by the board, eﬃcient constraint by the market and eﬀective execution
of power by stockholders. In many cases, these preconditions are far from being realized (Bebchuk and Fried,
2003). In theory, executive compensation is sensitive to corporate performance, but the reality in the business
world is quite diﬀerent (Edmans et al., 2008). Once a ﬂawed contract has been accepted, shareholders face the
risk of rent appropriation by management (Grossman and Hart, 1983; Hart and Moore, 1990).
The theory of managerial power provides a new explanation for the gap between compensation contracts
and actual compensation. This theory argues that management inﬂuences levels of compensation by interfer-
ing with compensation contract design and deriving rents from company proﬁts. The more control managers
have, the stronger their rent-grabbing capacity (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). According to the theory of man-
agerial power, increases in the sensitivity of compensation to performance do not result in a decrease in the
agency cost between shareholders and management, because corporate performance contains much noise.5
Market noise is caused both by objective factors from the eﬀects of the macro-economic environment or indus-
try development on corporate performance and by subjective factors such as earnings manipulation by man-
agement (Quan et al., 2010). Performance-based compensation contracts induce earnings manipulation by
managers, because the contracts push mangers to make eﬀorts toward the contract objective. Thus, while com-
pensation contracts aim to remove one agency problem, they lead to a diﬀerent agency problem.
As fair value is introduced into the new enterprise accounting standards, it becomes a new item in the com-
pensation contract. According to the theory of managerial power, the assessment of fair value becomes a new
method for managers to manipulate earnings and a new means for enhancing the contract’s eﬃciency in serv-
ing managers’ interests. The coexistence in China of deﬁciencies in property rights, deﬁciencies in securities
market regulation, the desire for power by private owners, weak internal controls and fatherly love given
to SOEs by the government (Lu, 2007a) make the valid oversight of management in Chinese listed companies
almost impossible. Such absence of constraints on managerial power makes the rent-seeking motivation of
managers stronger. In this way, managers can both hire and supervise themselves, becoming both designers
and implementers of their compensation contracts (Wang and Wang, 2007). Executives can increasingly
demand higher salaries based on the excuse of PCFV (Hou and Jin, 2010). When changes in fair value earn
proﬁts and operating performance is thereby improved, executives attribute the improvement to their own
eﬀorts and gain a louder voice in formulating their compensation plans. Likewise, executives use managerial
power to excuse LCFV in a disguised or opportunistic way (Na, 2009). They attribute losses to external factors
such as market changes to free themselves from obligations and do so with impunity. The sensitivity of exec-
utive compensation to corporate performance is asymmetric and is characterized by stickiness, which means
that an increase in executive pay on account of performance growth is higher than a decrease in executive pay5 Accounting performance is directly aﬀected by managers’ behavior, such as making changes in liability structure, inventory
management or accounting standards (Murphy, 2000). Market performance is less vulnerable to control by managers, but noise ﬂoods the
market (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998).
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PCFV is higher than the decrease in executive pay due to LCFV. The stronger the managerial power, the more
asymmetric the sensitivity of executive pay is to CFV. The above analysis leads to the following two
hypotheses:
H2. Increases in executive compensation due to PCFV are signiﬁcantly higher than decreases in executive
compensation due to LCFV.H3. The stronger the managerial power, the more asymmetric the sensitivity of executive compensation is to
CFV.4. Methodology
4.1. Data and sample
Our initial sample consists of 4893 Chinese ﬁrms listed on the A-share stock markets in Shanghai and
Shenzhen between 2007 and 2009. We drop observations from ﬁnance and insurance ﬁrms, and from ﬁrms
with no changes in proﬁts or losses due to changes in fair value. After merging the diﬀerent sources of data
and deleting observations with missing information, we obtain a ﬁnal data set consisting of 1148 ﬁrm-year
observations.
Data related to all variables was retrieved from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research
(CSMAR) database oﬀered by GTA Information Technology Co., Ltd.
The sample screening process and distribution are detailed in Table 1. Panel A of Table 1 reports the sample
screening process and yearly distribution. It shows that the 1148 observations are evenly distributed across theTable 1
Sample description.
2007 2008 2009 Total
Panel A: sample screening process and distribution by year
All A-share listed companies 1550 1625 1718 4893
Financial and insurance companies 36 32 39 107
Companies missing other data 1190 1199 1249 3638
Final observations 324 394 430 1148
Panel B: industry distribution by yeara
Agriculture 10 13 15 38
Mining 3 8 12 23
Manufacturing 173 218 245 636
Electric power, gas and water production and supply 12 17 14 43
Construction 4 5 8 17
Transport and storage 17 16 16 49
Information technology 31 31 28 90
Wholesale and retail 20 22 30 72
Real estate 13 19 19 51
Social service 13 11 13 37
Media and culture 3 5 3 11
Residual category 25 29 27 81
Total 324 394 430 1148
Panel C: distribution by CFV
Proﬁts from changes in fair value 222 70 322 614
Losses from changes in fair value 102 324 108 534
Total 324 394 430 1148
a Observations from the Finance and Insurance industry are omitted from the sample.
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the sample by year. Observations from the Manufacturing and Broadcasting and Media industries account for
55% and 1% of the total sample, respectively. The unbalanced distribution of our sample in diﬀerent industries
is consistent with the actual industrial distribution of China’s listed companies. Panel C of Table 1 reports the
distribution of positive and negative CFV. There are 614 observations with PCFV and 534 with LCFV,
accounting for 53.84% and 46.52% of the total sample, respectively. Due to the severe ﬁnancial crisis in
2008, the 324 observations with LCFV in that year account for 82.23% of the full sample, which is far higher
than the 31.48% for LCFV in 2007 and the 25.12% in 2009.
4.2. Variable deﬁnitions
4.2.1. Dependent variable: executive compensation
Executive compensation is mainly composed of monetary compensation and stock option incentives. Due
to the lagged implementation of equity incentive plans in China, few companies use these types of incentives
and their eﬀect on compensation is limited (Xin et al., 2007). Executive compensation is strictly regulated by
the government and few managers in Chinese listed companies hold ownership of stock (Li, 2000). Hence, pre-
vious studies show that monetary compensation is generally the same as executive compensation. Considering
the diﬀerent deﬁnitions of the term executive, executive compensation is commonly measured by the monetary
compensation of the top three managers (Lu, 2007b; Fang, 2009; Hou and Jin, 2010; Quan et al., 2010), by
compensation of the top three directors (Lu, 2007b; Fang, 2009; Hou and Jin, 2010; Quan et al., 2010), by
compensation of the top three directors, supervisors or managers (Xu and Zeng, 2010) or by compensation
of the chairman of the board, CEO and CFO (Zhou et al., 2010).
We examine the inﬂuence of CFV on executive compensation. To undertake a thorough investigation of
this relationship, we select the ﬁrst three types of executive compensation discussed above as our dependent
variables, which are respectively symbolized by lntm (monetary compensation of top three managers), lndir
(monetary compensation of top three directors) and lncomp (monetary compensation of top three directors,
supervisors and managers). The fourth type of executive compensation is classiﬁed into four variables: mon-
etary compensation to the chairman of the board (lnchair), CEO (lnceo), CFO (lncfo) and the total of all three
(lnchair_ceo_cfo). These variables are used in the robustness tests.
4.2.2. Independent variables
We use fair_value, measured as the amount of CFV in the income statement of the annual report, to proxy
for proﬁts and losses from changes in fair value.
Operating income (oper_inco) is calculated by deducting costs and expenses from revenue. The computation
is as follows: operating income = operating revenue  operating costs  business tax and surcharges  sales
expenses  administration expenses  interest expense  asset impairment losses.
Considering the close relationship between equity and CFV, both fair_value and oper_inco are adjusted by
shareholders’ equity at the beginning of each year (Zhou et al., 2010).
Managerial power (power) tends to take on the characteristics of relativity (Quan et al., 2010) and conceal-
ment (Lu, 2008), thus it is diﬃcult to measure managerial power reliably and eﬀectively with a single indicator.
We select three main indicators of managerial power. First, duality of the chairman of the board and the CEO
position is the most obvious manifestation of concentration in managerial power (Lu, 2008). Second, owner-
ship concentration can eﬀectively control excessive managerial power (Chen, 2010). When ownership is highly
dispersed and controlled by various major shareholders, collusion can occur between major shareholders and
managers (Huang, 2006). Once the power of shareholders and managers becomes a joint force, managerial
power tends to peak (Lu, 2008). Third, executive tenure reﬂects managerial power from another perspective.
With longer tenure, CEOs have a stronger ability to control companies. We thus use three indicators, power1,
power2 and power3, to proxy for the three types of one-dimensional managerial power discussed above.
Power1 is a proxy for duality (power1 equals 1 if the chairman and CEO are the same person, and 0 otherwise).
Power2 is a proxy for ownership concentration (power2 equals 1 if the holding ratio of the largest shareholder
divided by the accumulated ratio of the top two to ten shareholders is less than 1, and 0 otherwise). Power3 is a
proxy for executive tenure (power3 equals 1 if the tenure of the chairman of the board or CEO is greater than
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of Power1, Power2 and Power3. Power equals 1 when the sum exceeds 2, and 0 otherwise.
4.2.3. Control variables
In accordance with prior studies (Leone and Zimmerman, 2006; Fang, 2009; Hou and Jin, 2010; Zhou
et al., 2010), we also control for other variables that are related to executive compensation. These are the num-
ber of board members (board), the proportion of independent directors on the board (inde_dir), sales revenue
(lnsale), sales growth (salegrowth), asset–liability ratio (leverage), adjusted annual stock return (adj_return),
per capita income in the region where the corporation is registered (lnaver_inco), the nature of the company’s
property rights (soe), whether the company is cross-listed in other nations (cross), turnover of the chairman
(chair), turnover of the CEO (ceo), the presence of a compensation committee (comp_comm), whether the com-
pany is in a regulated industry (regulate), whether the company is in a middle region (middle) and whether the
company is in a western region (west).
More detailed information on the deﬁnitions of these variables is reported in Table 2.Table 2
Variable deﬁnitions.
Variables Deﬁnitions
Panel A: dependent variables
lncomp Natural logarithm of total compensation of top three directors, supervisors and managers, excluding allowances received
by independent directors
lndir Natural logarithm of total compensation of top three directors, excluding allowances received by independent directors
lntm Natural logarithm of total compensation of top three managers, excluding allowances received by management
Panel B: independent variables
fair_value Proﬁts and losses from changes in fair value, divided by stockholders’ equity at the end of the previous year
oper_inco Operating income, or the diﬀerence between operating revenue and operating expenses (which includes operating costs,
business taxes and surcharges, sales expenses, administration expenses, interest expense, and asset impairment losses)
divided by stockholders’ equity at the end of the previous year
power Dummy variable for managerial power. If power1 + power2 + power3P 2, power is assigned the value of 1, and 0
otherwise. Power1 is a dummy variable for duality. If the chairman and CEO are the same person, it is assigned the value
of 1, and 0 otherwise. Power2 is a dummy variable for ownership concentration. If the holding ratio of the largest
shareholder divided by the accumulated ratio of the top two to ten shareholders is less than 1, it is assigned the value of 1,
and 0 otherwise. Power3 is a dummy variable for executive tenure. If the tenure of chairman or CEO is greater than the
mean it is assigned the value of 1, and 0 otherwise
Panel C: control variables
board Number of board members
inde_dir Proportion of independent directors on the board
lnsale Natural logarithm of operating revenue
salegrowth Growth in sales. Equals the absolute value of the diﬀerence between operating revenue for the present year and last year,
divided by operating revenue for last year
leverage Ratio of total liabilities to total assets
adj_return Adjusted annual stock return. Equals the company’s annual stock return less the market annual stock return
lnaver_inco Per capita income in the region where the corporation is registered. Equals the natural logarithm of per capita disposable
income of urban households
soe Dummy variable assigned the value of 1 for state-owned enterprises, and 0 otherwise
cross Dummy variable assigned the value of 1 for cross-listed companies, and 0 otherwise
chair Dummy variable assigned the value of 1 for turnover of the chairman, and 0 otherwise
ceo Dummy variable assigned the value of 1 for turnover of the CEO, and 0 otherwise
comp_comm Dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if a compensation committee is constituted, and 0 otherwise
regulate Dummy variable assigned the value of 1 for companies in regulated industries, and 0 otherwise
middle Dummy variable for the middle region. If a corporation is registered in the middle region (Provinces of Shanxi, Jilin,
Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei or Hunan), it is assigned the value of 1, and 0 otherwise
west Dummy variable for the western region. If a corporation is registered in the western regions (Chongqing, Inner Mongolia,
Tibet, Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, or the provinces of Guangxi, Sichuan,
Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu or Qinghai), it is assigned the value of 1, and 0 otherwise
dum Dummy variable assigned the value of 1 for proﬁts from changes in fair value, and 0 otherwise
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Table 3 summarizes the descriptive statistics. As the table shows, there are no diﬀerences among the means
(or medians) of lncomp, lndir and lntm. The amount of compensation ranges from 814,200 (e13.610) to 1,077,300
(e13.890) yuan, which shows an uneven distribution of executive compensation. Among the three types of mea-
surements of executive pay, compensation of the top three directors is relatively low and compensation of the
top three directors, supervisors and managers is relatively high. The mean (median) of fair_value is 0.001 (0)
and the standard deviation is 0.059. The mean (median) of oper_inco is 0.133 (0.054) and the standard devi-
ation is 2.053. The mean of power is 0.243, and the third quantile is 0, which means more than three quarters of
the sample companies have lower degrees of managerial power.
As shown in Table 3, about 60% of the sample ﬁrms are owned by the state, 16% (17%) experienced turn-
over of the chairman or CEO, 97% of the ﬁrms have constituted a compensation committee, 19% of the ﬁrms
are located in the middle region, 13% of the ﬁrms are located in the western region and 68% are in the eastern
region. The mean and median of adj_return are 0.261 and 0.038 (the great diﬀerence between these returns may
result from the severe ﬁnancial crisis in 2008). The mean (median) ratio of total liabilities to total assets is
64.3% (51.9%), which indicates a reasonable capital structure for the sample companies. The number of board
members ranges from 4 to 16 with a mean (median) of 9.230 (9) board members. The mean (median) of
inde_dir is 0.366 (0.333), which is consistent with the regulations of the China Securities Regulatory
Commission. The minimum of inde_dir is 0.222, which indicates that some companies in the sample do not
meet the required threshold of one-third independent members. The standard deviation of inde_dir is 0.053,
which implies a slight change in the ratio of independent directors on the board over the time of the survey.
In general, all variables are normally distributed with little diﬀerence between the mean and the median
(excluding oper_inco, salegrowth and adj_return). In addition, according to the standard deviation and ﬁrst
and third quantile statistics, there is adequate variation in the variables during the sample period.
Descriptive statistics of the three executive compensation variables categorized by positive or negative CFV
are shown in Table 4. As indicated in this table, compensation for all types of executives rises year by year and
the growth in compensation in companies suﬀering LCFV is relatively higher than in companies earning
PCFV. The three executive compensation variables show little diﬀerence in either their means or medians.
In general, executive compensation does not change with changes in fair value. There is little diﬀerence inTable 3
Descriptive statistics.
Variable N Mean Std Min P25 P50 P75 Max
lncomp 1148 13.890 0.799 11.230 13.410 13.870 14.360 16.650
lndir 1148 13.610 0.931 4.754 13.050 13.610 14.200 16.600
lntm 1146 13.760 0.809 10.360 13.230 13.770 14.230 16.530
fair_value 1148 0.001 0.059 1.794 0.001 0 0.002 0.243
oper_inco 1148 0.133 2.053 3.908 0.006 0.054 0.147 68.560
power 1148 0.243 0.429 0 0 0 0 1
board 1148 9.230 1.866 4 9 9 10 16
inde_dir 1148 0.366 0.053 0.222 0.333 0.333 0.385 0.714
lnsale 1148 21.290 1.640 9.310 20.340 21.140 22.140 28.000
salegrowth 1148 1.778 44.450 0.995 0.070 0.098 0.290 1497.000
leverage 1148 0.643 4.203 0.018 0.371 0.519 0.668 142.700
adj_return 1148 0.261 0.891 1.592 0.130 0.038 0.497 7.242
lnaver_inco 1148 9.876 0.299 9.293 9.619 9.912 10.130 10.390
soe 1148 0.602 0.490 0 0 1 1 1
cross 1148 0.063 0.243 0 0 0 0 1
chair 1148 0.163 0.369 0 0 0 0 1
ceo 1148 0.170 0.376 0 0 0 0 1
comp_comm 1148 0.968 0.177 0 1 1 1 1
regulate 1148 0.037 0.190 0 0 0 0 1
middle 1148 0.190 0.392 0 0 0 0 1
west 1148 0.134 0.341 0 0 0 0 1
Table 4
Executive compensation and CFV (in 10 thousands of yuan).
2007 2008 2009 Total
Compensation of the top three directors, supervisors and managers
Proﬁts from changes in fair value
Mean 141.98 145.85 161.97 152.90
Median 99.80 118.35 111.64 107.45
Std 159.28 104.53 171.51 160.84
Losses from changes in fair value
Mean 117.70 155.01 179.84 152.90
Median 77.55 108.65 119.02 104.44
Std 179.56 191.08 164.83 184.60
Compensation of the top three directors
Proﬁts from changes in fair value
Mean 111.36 118.74 135.09 124.65
Median 75.00 86.67 90.10 83.24
Std 133.36 100.32 161.54 146.06
Losses from changes in fair value
Mean 98.26 124.32 138.19 122.15
Median 58.28 82.51 90.85 78.90
Std 169.23 161.12 133.26 157.76
Compensation of the top three managers
Proﬁts from changes in fair value
Mean 119.64 130.38 136.09 129.49
Median 87.83 104.22 98.00 95.28
Std 118.92 95.92 127.06 121.02
Losses from changes in fair value
Mean 104.84 133.26 165.28 134.31
Median 72.71 96.60 112.95 95.39
Std 155.06 153.41 158.65 155.67
R. Shao et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 269–292 279compensation in relation to changes in fair value, either in the mean or the median. In 2007, the executive
compensation in companies earning PCFV is a little higher and the executive compensation in companies suf-
fering LCFV is also a little higher. It is obvious that executive compensation in companies suﬀering LCFV is
not less than executive compensation in companies earning PCFV, which means that LCFV has no signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on executive compensation.
4.4. Correlation analysis
Table 5 presents the correlation matrix for our sample. Spearman correlation coeﬃcients are reported in the
upper right corner and Pearson correlation coeﬃcients in the bottom left corner.
Table 5 shows that there is no signiﬁcant correlation between executive compensation and CFV (fair_va-
lue). Operating income (oper_inco) is positively correlated with executive compensation, which implies that
operating income is a reasonable indicator to evaluate performance. Managerial power (power) is signiﬁcantly
correlated with executive compensation, which indicates that the greater the managerial power, the higher the
executive compensation. Other variables such as board, inde_dir, lnsale, lnaver_inco, cross, comp_comm (not
signiﬁcant in the Spearman coeﬃcient), middle and west are signiﬁcantly correlated with executive compensa-
tion. These signiﬁcant correlations indicate that bigger boards, more independent directors, greater sales and
higher per capita income, cross-listing and compensation committees all contribute to higher executive com-
pensation. Table 5 also reports that executive compensation in ﬁrms located in the middle and western regions
is lower than that of ﬁrms in eastern regions. In addition, the coeﬃcients in Table 5 suggest that the correla-
tions between independent variables are reasonable. We further compute variance inﬂation factors (VIFs) and
ﬁnd that there are no potential multicollinearity problems among the variables listed in Table 5.
Table 5
Correlation coeﬃcient matrix.
lncomp lndir lntm fair_value oper_inco power board inde_dir lnsale salegrowth leverage adj_return lnaver_inco soe cross chair ceo comp_comm regulate middle west
lncomp 1 0.887* 0.970* 0.037 0.318* 0.125* 0.128* 0.124* 0.451* 0.110 0.019 0.030 0.314* 0.048 0.256* 0.050 0.022 0.082 0.044 0.164* 0.230*
lndir 0.855* 1 0.834* 0.033 0.303* 0.128* 0.158* 0.056 0.408* 0.107 0.035 0.015 0.229* 0.032 0.214* 0.089 0.033 0.078 0.071 0.144* 0.176*
lntm 0.960* 0.800* 1 0.025 0.311* 0.144* 0.136* 0.116 0.456* 0.103 0.025 0.033 0.332* 0.096 0.265* 0.032 0.027 0.076 0.033 0.167* 0.242*
fair_value 0.001 0.046 0.003 1 0.032 0.012 0.030 0.007 0.017 0.020 0.005 0.066 0.043 0.043 0.029 0.026 0.004 0.041 0.0202 0.032 0.004
oper_inco 0.121* 0.114* 0.099* 0.034 1 0.082 0.020 0.024 0.332* 0.449* 0.041 0.119 0.036 0.052 0.099 0.060 0.022 0.047 0.0531 0.015 0.019
power 0.116* 0.111* 0.132* 0.005 0.017 1 0.040 0.006 0.092 0.015 0.112 0.030 0.011 0.176* 0.038 0.015 0.040 0.069 0.0271 0.032 0.037
board 0.129* 0.150* 0.136* 0.007 0.005 0.033 1 0.167* 0.267* 0.039 0.105 0.062 0.003 0.210* 0.172* 0.037 0.062 0.034 0.0819 0.004 0.006
inde_dir 0.095* 0.031 0.090* 0.093* 0.026 0.017 0.217* 1 0.061 0.026 0.014 0.009 0.045 0.007 0.106 0.013 0.008 0.039 0.0007 0.006 0.067
lnsale 0.438* 0.382* 0.470* 0.066 0.030 0.091* 0.314* 0.093* 1 0.193* 0.349* 0.018 0.139* 0.242* 0.370* 0.016 0.044 0.097 0.0244 0.052 0.078
salegrowth 0.006 0.006 0.012 0.014 0.001 0.018 0.067 0.015 0.030 1 0.073 0.101 0.163* 0.047 0.059 0.004 0.030 0.018 0.0384 0.073 0.0595
leverage 0.015 0.009 0.010* 0.003 0.000 0.022 0.064 0.019 0.205* 0.002 1 0.025 0.044 0.095 0.092 0.048 0.002 0.007 0.0438 0.003 0.077
adj_return 0.039 0.029 0.046 0.055 0.003 0.035 0.037 0.009 0.018 0.160* 0.012 1 0.03 0.028 0.081 0.057 0.029 0.010 0.0219 0.051 0.038
lnaver_inco 0.296* 0.210* 0.317* 0.052 0.039 0.015 0.008 0.038 0.161* 0.003 0.027 0.061 1 0.034 0.0841 0.023 0.016 0.038 0.0408 0.515* 0.454*
soe 0.027 0.033 0.089* 0.043 0.010 0.174* 0.196* 0.005 0.275* 0.033 0.033 0.022 0.037 1 0.173* 0.077 0.021 0.044 0.0758 0.066 0.046
cross 0.246* 0.201* 0.258* 0.125* 0.002 0.038 0.188* 0.152* 0.448* 0.009 0.002 0.025 0.088* 0.174* 1 0.013 0.0072 0.047 0.0056 0.043 0.049
chair 0.054 0.090* 0.037 0.005 0.061 0.014 0.027 0.018 0.021 0.080* 0.009 0.051 0.021 0.074 0.012 1 0.216* 0.027 0.0127 0.014 0.013
ceo 0.014 0.024 0.022 0.000 0.070 0.040 0.054 0.026 0.044 0.013 0.014 0.018 0.018 0.022 0.007 0.215* 1 0.030 0.0405 0.012 0.021
comp_comm 0.086* 0.078* 0.085* 0.028 0.016 0.069 0.015 0.052 0.098* 0.007 0.005 0.099* 0.035 0.043 0.047 0.026 0.030 1 0.0101 0.013 0.001
regulate 0.052 0.065 0.038 0.006 0.010 0.027 0.091* 0.001 0.016 0.007 0.004 0.006 0.044 0.076* 0.006 0.012 0.040 0.010 1 0.150* 0.064
middle 0.150* 0.122* 0.154* 0.001 0.058 0.031 0.003 0.000 0.053 0.015 0.015 0.025 0.535* 0.067 0.043 0.015 0.012 0.013 0.150* 1 0.190*
west 0.229* 0.178* 0.244* 0.026 0.007 0.038 0.020 0.029 0.090* 0.013 0.080* 0.055 0.463* 0.043 0.049 0.008 0.022 0.000 0.064 0.191* 1
Note: The upper right corner reports Spearman correlation coeﬃcients and the bottom left corner reports Pearson correlation coeﬃcients.
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5.1. Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 predicts that executive compensation is positively related to CFV. Following Dechow et al.









plausibcomp ¼ a0 þ a1fair valueþ a2oper incoþ a3power þ a4board þ a5inde dir þ a6 insaleþ a7salegrowth
þ a8leverageþ a9adj returnþ a10 ln ave incoþ a11soeþ a12crossþ a13chair þ a14ceo
þ a15comp commþ a16regulateþ a17middleþ a18west þ eIn this model, comp refers to the terms lntm, lncomp and lndir, and the regression coeﬃcient of fair_value is
our primary concern. If a1 is signiﬁcantly positive, then executive compensation is positively related to CFV.
That is to say, CFV has a positive eﬀect on executive compensation.
Table 6 reports the regression results from Model (1). The dependent variables in columns 1–3 are the com-
pensation of the top three managers (lntm), the top three directors, supervisors, and managers (lncomp), and
the top three directors (lndir), respectively. Table 6 shows that the coeﬃcient on fair_value is signiﬁcantly posi-
tive for lntm, lncomp and lndir, which indicates that all three types of executive compensation are signiﬁcantly
related to CFV (a1 > 0, t-values are 3.49, 4.14, and 7.96,
6 respectively). Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is supported.
Concerning lntm, the regression coeﬃcient means that if CFV increases by one unit, compensation of top man-
agers increases by 69.7%. The probable reason for these results is that the board or compensation committee
considers the eﬀects of CFV on executive compensation when designing the compensation plan. As past
investment decisions do aﬀect shareholders’ wealth and the compensation contract may be based on account-
ing performance, executives may use CFV as an excuse to ask for higher salaries (Hou and Jin, 2010).
The results in Table 6 are not the same as the ﬁndings of Hou and Jin (2010) and of Xu and Zeng (2010).
Hou and Jin (2010) ﬁnd that a positive relationship between executive compensation and CFV exists only
when proﬁts are earned from changes in fair value and a negative relationship exists when losses are suﬀered
from changes in fair value. Xu and Zeng (2010) argue that the positive relationship between executive com-
pensation and CFV is signiﬁcant only in companies with PCFV and no signiﬁcant relationship exists in sample
companies suﬀering LCFV. We argue that several reasons contribute to these diﬀerences in results. First, our
sample period is from 2007 to 2009, rather than the 2007–2008 period used by Hou and Jin (2010) and Xu and
Zeng (2010). Second, due to the global ﬁnancial crisis in 2008, more than 80% of the sample ﬁrms suﬀered
LCFV in 2008, as shown in Table 3. This crisis may have had a great inﬂuence on the regression results
for companies suﬀering from LCFV. In 2009, the securities markets recovered gradually and CFV became
more normal. After the experience of the ﬁnancial crisis, the boards or the compensation committees may have
started to include CFV in compensation evaluation systems. Thus, CFV is also signiﬁcantly related to exec-
utive compensation when companies suﬀer LCFV.
Table 6 also reports that the coeﬃcient on oper_inco is signiﬁcantly positive at the 1% level, thus showing
that executive compensation is sensitive to operating income. However, this sensitivity is lower than the sen-
sitivity of executive compensation to CFV (a1 = 0.697, a2 = 0.042). There are two explanations for this. One is
that income from operations and from investment are diﬀerentiated in the design of compensation contracts,
with investment income from CFV showing a stronger relationship with the level of compensation.7 The othere signiﬁcant correlation between executive compensation and CFV is not found in Table 5. However, CFV has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence
cutive compensation after other variables are controlled for in Table 6. Thus, we infer that one or more control variables must
antly change the coeﬃcient of fair_value in the multiple regression analysis. To identify the relevant variables, we enter the control
les one by one into the regression equation of Model (1) and ﬁnd that a signiﬁcant positive relationship between executive
nsation and CFV emerges after lnsale and cross are added into the regression. The addition of other control variables fails to change
ﬃcient of fair_value.
he company earns one more dollar through business operations, the manager may get one more cent. If the company earns one
ollar through investment (or trading ﬁnancial assets), the manager may get ten more cents. Although the above explanation may be
le in theory, further exploration is required to determine whether this reﬂects reality in practice.
Table 6
Regression of executive compensation on CFV.
lntm lncomp lndir
1 2 3
fair_value 0.697*** 0.680*** 1.303***
(3.49) (4.14) (7.96)
oper_inco 0.042*** 0.049*** 0.055***
(8.80) (9.87) (10.40)
power 0.322*** 0.271*** 0.281***
(6.96) (5.87) (5.12)
board 0.010 0.015 0.035**
(0.84) (1.14) (2.27)
inde_dir 0.671* 0.816** 0.123
(1.84) (2.19) (0.27)
lnsale 0.204*** 0.196*** 0.212***
(13.06) (11.47) (9.60)
salegrowth 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.74) (1.38) (0.98)
leverage 0.001 0.016*** 0.018***
(0.40) (10.42) (9.20)
adj_return 0.015 0.014 0.011
(0.67) (0.59) (0.34)
lnaver_inco 0.328*** 0.263** 0.045
(3.01) (2.53) (0.37)
soe 0.029 0.078* 0.200***
(0.67) (1.75) (3.88)
comp_comm 0.212* 0.217* 0.267**
(1.89) (1.96) (2.10)
cross 0.158 0.160 0.149
(1.51) (1.55) (1.23)
chair 0.085 0.102* 0.198***
(1.45) (1.81) (2.88)
ceo 0.091 0.069 0.089
(1.60) (1.22) (1.31)
regulate 0.136 0.173* 0.266**
(1.34) (1.71) (2.24)
middle 0.194** 0.201*** 0.266***
(2.58) (2.72) (3.26)
west 0.402*** 0.387*** 0.438***
(4.32) (4.37) (4.34)
Constant 5.642*** 6.555*** 8.226***
(5.19) (6.37) (6.94)
N 1146 1148 1148
Adj. R2 0.337 0.308 0.245
F 84.544 29.687 26.310
Notes: t Statistics are in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
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in Model (1). Changes in fair value may reﬂect diﬀerences in proﬁt models or other characteristics that aﬀect
the level of executive compensation.8 Power is signiﬁcantly positively related to executive compensation at the
1% level, suggesting that the degree of managerial power plays an important role in determining executive
compensation and the greater the managerial power, the higher the executive compensation.8 We test this explanation using a ﬁxed eﬀects regression, and ﬁnd that the regression coeﬃcient of fair_vaue is no higher than that of
oper_inco, thus indicating that Model (1) does omit some unobservable factors, which may have a certain inﬂuence on the levels of
executive compensation.
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1 and 2), lnsale, leverage (columns 2 and 3) and comp_comm are all signiﬁcantly positively related to executive
compensation, which indicates that companies with bigger boards, more independent directors, higher sales,
higher leverage, higher per capita income, and compensation committees all tend to set higher pay for exec-
utives. Soe, chair (columns 2 and 3), regulate (columns 2 and 3), middle and west are all signiﬁcantly negatively
related to executive compensation, which indicates that companies that are state owned, have experienced
chairman turnover, are in regulated industries and are in the middle or western regions tend to pay less to
executives. These ﬁnding are consistent with other studies (Fang, 2009; Hou and Jin, 2010; Zhou et al.,
2010; Xu and Zeng, 2010).
5.2. Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the rise in executive compensation due to PCFV is signiﬁcantly higher than the
decrease in executive compensation due to LCFV. Following Fang (2009), Model (2) is given ascomp ¼ b0 þ b1fair valueþ b2dumþ b3dum  fair valueþ b4oper incoþ b5power þ b6board
þ b7inde dir þ b8lnsaleþ b9salegrowthþ b10leverageþ b11adj returnþ b12lnaveþ b13soe
þ b14crossþ b15chair þ b16ceoþ b17comp commþ b18regulateþ b19middleþ b20west þ eIn this model, compensation (comp) refers to the terms lntm, lncomp and lndir. Dum is a dummy variable
assigned the value of 1 for PCFV, and 0 otherwise. Our main interest is b3, the coeﬃcient on the interaction
term between dum and fair_value. If b3 is signiﬁcantly greater than 0, this means that the increase in executive
compensation due to PCFV is greater than the decrease in executive compensation due to LCFV, then we can
draw the conclusion that the sensitivity is asymmetric.
Table 7 reports the results concerning the asymmetry of executive compensation on CFV. The coeﬃcient on
dum  fair_value is signiﬁcantly positive in columns 1 and 2 at the 1% and 10% levels, respectively, which
means that the sensitivity of executive compensation to CFV is strongly asymmetric. A probable explanation
is that executives with strong managerial power may ask for higher compensation due to PCFV and ﬁnd
excuses to explain LCFV in an opportunistic way, to reduce losses to their personal salaries (Hou and Jin,
2010). In column 3, the coeﬃcient on dum  fair_value is negative but not signiﬁcant, which demonstrates that
the sensitivity of directors’ compensation to CFV is not characterized by stickiness. A probable explanation is
that most directors do not participate directly in the operation and management of companies, and have no
ability to further their personal interests on account of CFV.
The regression results of other variables in Model (2) are consistent with those in Model (1).
5.3. Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 predicts that the stronger the managerial power, the more asymmetric the sensitivity of exec-
utive compensation is to CFV. Based on Model (1) and Model (2), we build Model (3) to test H3.
Model (3):comp ¼ c0 þ c1fair valueþ c2oper incoþ c3dum  fair valueþ c4dum  fair valueþ c5power  dum
þ c6fair value  power þ c7power  dum  fair valueþ c8board þ c9inside dir þ c10lnsale
þ c11salegrowthþ c12leverageþ c13adj returnþ c14lnaveþ c15soeþ c16crossþ c17chair þ c18ceo
þ c19comp commþ c20regulateþ c21middleþ c22west þ eIn this model, comp refers to the terms lntm, lncomp and lndir. Dum is a dummy variable assigned the value
of 1 for PCFV and 0 otherwise. Power represents the degree of managerial power, and equals 1 for strong
managerial power and 0 otherwise. Our main interest is c7, the regression coeﬃcient on power -
 dum  fair_value. If c7 is signiﬁcantly greater than 0, Hypothesis 3 is supported.
Table 7
Regression of the asymmetry of executive compensation on CFV.
lntm lncomp lndir
1 2 3
fair_value 0.433*** 0.482*** 1.246***
(3.41) (3.96) (8.61)
oper_inco 0.041*** 0.049*** 0.055***
(9.18) (10.15) (10.44)
dum 0.006 0.015 0.040
(0.15) (0.37) (0.79)
dum*fair_value 2.852*** 1.835* 0.029
(2.65) (1.76) (0.02)
power 0.323*** 0.272*** 0.283***
(6.97) (5.88) (5.12)
board 0.011 0.015 0.034**
(0.94) (1.19) (2.25)
inde_dir 0.628* 0.783** 0.111
(1.74) (2.11) (0.25)
lnsale 0.204*** 0.196*** 0.212***
(13.02) (11.43) (9.57)
salegrowth 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.55) (1.26) (0.98)
leverage 0.001 0.016*** 0.018***
(0.44) (10.28) (9.21)
adj_return 0.018 0.017 0.013
(0.82) (0.73) (0.40)
lnaver_inco 0.330*** 0.261** 0.038
(3.04) (2.52) (0.32)
soe 0.033 0.075* 0.199***
(0.76) (1.67) (3.84)
comp_com 0.222** 0.226** 0.271**
(2.02) (2.06) (2.14)
cross 0.140 0.148 0.150
(1.33) (1.43) (1.23)
chair 0.089 0.105* 0.199***
(1.52) (1.86) (2.90)
ceo 0.089 0.068 0.089
(1.57) (1.20) (1.30)
regulate 0.136 0.171* 0.263**
(1.35) (1.70) (2.21)
middle 0.186** 0.197*** 0.269***
(2.47) (2.68) (3.31)
west 0.403*** 0.388*** 0.440***
(4.31) (4.36) (4.35)
Constant 5.621*** 6.561*** 8.265***
(5.17) (6.39) (6.96)
N 1146 1148 1148
Adj. R2 0.339 0.309 0.244
F 71.035 27.216 24.734
Notes: t Statistics are in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
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cient on power  dum  fair_value is positive and signiﬁcant almost at the 10% level. This result indicates that
managerial power does have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the stickiness of executive compensation and the stron-
ger the managerial power, the more asymmetric the sensitivity of executive compensation is to CFV. Hypoth-
Table 8
Regression on whether managerial power inﬂuences the stickiness of executive compensation.
lntm lncomp lndir
1 2 3
fair_value 0.456*** 0.507*** 1.257***
(3.94) (4.49) (8.73)
oper_inco 0.041*** 0.049*** 0.055***
(8.99) (9.98) (10.35)
power 0.334*** 0.257*** 0.280***
(5.07) (3.90) (3.46)
dum 0.010 0.017 0.044
(0.21) (0.37) (0.72)
dum*fair_value 2.086* 1.192 0.395
(1.78) (1.05) (0.31)
power*dum 0.072 0.014 0.019
(0.73) (0.14) (0.17)
fair_value*power 0.789 0.787 0.345
(0.63) (0.66) (0.29)
power*dum*fair_value 5.280+ 4.471 2.474
(1.60) (1.36) (0.64)
board 0.011 0.015 0.034**
(0.92) (1.18) (2.24)
inde_dir 0.610* 0.784** 0.107
(1.68) (2.10) (0.24)
lnsale 0.203*** 0.196*** 0.212***
(12.99) (11.41) (9.55)
salegrowth 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.57) (1.28) (0.98)
leverage 0.001 0.016*** 0.018***
(0.39) (10.26) (9.21)
adj_return 0.017 0.016 0.012
(0.78) (0.67) (0.38)
lnaver_inco 0.328*** 0.259** 0.037
(3.03) (2.51) (0.31)
soe 0.033 0.075* 0.199***
(0.75) (1.68) (3.84)
comp_com 0.240** 0.243** 0.281**
(2.20) (2.21) (2.17)
cross 0.144 0.152 0.152
(1.36) (1.46) (1.24)
chair 0.085 0.103* 0.197***
(1.45) (1.80) (2.85)
ceo 0.088 0.066 0.088
(1.55) (1.17) (1.29)
regulate 0.136 0.168* 0.262**
(1.35) (1.66) (2.19)
middle 0.187** 0.198*** 0.270***
(2.49) (2.70) (3.31)
west 0.401*** 0.388*** 0.440***
(4.32) (4.38) (4.35)
Constant 5.627*** 6.566*** 8.267***
(5.19) (6.40) (6.96)
N 1146 1148 1148
Adj. R2 0.339 0.308 0.242
F 63.080 23.923 22.631
Notes: t Statistics are in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
+ Signiﬁcant almost at the 10% level (p-value is 0.111).
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Table 9
Robustness test on the relationship between executive compensation and CFV.
lnchair lnceo lncfo lnchair_ceo_cfo
fair_value 0.510 2.170* 0.910*** 0.992***
(0.33) (1.88) (3.30) (4.07)
oper_inco 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.004 0.057***
(10.10) (13.14) (1.02) (16.85)
power 0.465*** 0.293*** 0.257*** 0.377***
(5.94) (4.95) (4.45) (6.21)
board 0.003 0.011 0.025* 0.010
(0.14) (0.69) (1.75) (0.60)
inde_dir 1.294 1.007** 0.387 0.637
(1.64) (2.12) (0.81) (1.08)
lnsale 0.220*** 0.198*** 0.187*** 0.141***
(4.72) (9.06) (9.12) (4.77)
salegrowth 0.001*** 0.000 0.003 0.000**
(3.35) (0.77) (1.30) (2.53)
leverage 0.419** 0.274** 0.281** 0.320**
(2.11) (2.01) (2.21) (2.49)
adj_return 0.011 0.016 0.010 0.016
(0.24) (0.59) (0.35) (0.51)
lnaver_inco 0.269 0.318** 0.521*** 0.213
(1.31) (2.41) (3.62) (1.50)
soe 0.118 0.023 0.179*** 0.088
(1.23) (0.42) (3.34) (1.19)
comp_comm 0.324 0.229 0.041 0.359**
(1.47) (1.35) (0.25) (2.27)
cross 0.380* 0.181 0.236* 0.276**
(1.92) (1.64) (1.93) (2.16)
chair 0.275* 0.029 0.105 0.278***
(1.74) (0.40) (1.27) (3.49)
ceo 0.144 0.420*** 0.144* 0.111
(1.31) (5.53) (1.92) (1.57)
regulate 0.034 0.067 0.064 0.007
(0.20) (0.54) (0.49) (0.06)
middle 0.234 0.156* 0.015 0.134
(1.29) (1.68) (0.15) (1.04)
west 0.195 0.428*** 0.267** 0.303***
(1.20) (4.13) (2.44) (2.62)
Constant 4.742** 4.855*** 3.272** 7.795***
(2.08) (3.59) (2.20) (4.71)
N 800 843 810 1111
Adj. R2 0.151 0.261 0.271 0.141
F 22.746 26.504 16.592 26.600
Note: Lnchair is the natural logarithm of the chairman’s compensation (if the chairman and CEO are the same person, the chairman’s
value is used). Lnceo is the natural logarithm of CEO compensation (if the CEO and CFO are the same person, the CEO’s value is used).
Lncfo is the natural logarithm of CFO compensation. Ln_chair_ceo_cfo is the natural logarithm of the total compensation of the
chairman, CEO and CFO. The t statistics are in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
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positive, but not signiﬁcant, which implies that the level of directors’ compensation is inﬂuenced by managerial
power, but the inﬂuence is not signiﬁcant. A possible explanation is that managerial power originates from
management, and if most directors have no position in management, the management lacks motivation to seek
higher compensation for directors.
The regression results of other variables in Model (3) are consistent with those in Model (1).
Table 10
Robustness test on the asymmetry of executive compensation to CFV.
lntm lncomp lndir
D = 1 D = 0 D = 1 D = 0 D = 1 D = 0
fair_value 3.004*** 0.308** 2.045** 0.429*** 0.675 1.192***
(2.76) (2.05) (2.01) (2.79) (0.54) (6.94)
oper_inco 0.150 0.041*** 0.152 0.049*** 0.223 0.055***
(1.16) (13.23) (1.11) (12.85) (1.38) (14.32)
power 0.293*** 0.331*** 0.273*** 0.261*** 0.281*** 0.292***
(4.46) (5.10) (4.13) (3.97) (3.75) (3.31)
board 0.020 0.002 0.024 0.004 0.043** 0.027
(1.27) (0.09) (1.39) (0.23) (2.07) (1.17)
inde_dir 0.863* 0.455 1.041** 0.655 0.564 0.167
(1.73) (0.84) (2.01) (1.19) (0.91) (0.25)
lnsale 0.195*** 0.221*** 0.191*** 0.198*** 0.209*** 0.208***
(8.89) (9.47) (8.31) (7.11) (7.87) (5.70)
salegrowth 0.000 0.005*** 0.000** 0.005** 0.000** 0.009***
(1.30) (3.18) (2.03) (2.28) (2.00) (3.20)
leverage 0.001 0.309** 0.017*** 0.011 0.019*** 0.037
(0.77) (2.37) (8.52) (0.06) (8.37) (0.17)
adj_return 0.040* 0.051 0.033 0.032 0.012 0.010
(1.68) (1.00) (1.26) (0.64) (0.37) (0.11)
lnaver_inco 0.350** 0.306* 0.290** 0.249 0.171 0.076
(2.54) (1.81) (2.18) (1.53) (1.17) (0.38)
soe 0.045 0.016 0.059 0.090 0.183*** 0.195**
(0.76) (0.24) (0.97) (1.36) (2.63) (2.40)
comp_com 0.120 0.335** 0.170 0.282** 0.251 0.228
(0.81) (2.31) (1.12) (2.13) (1.53) (1.21)
cross 0.092 0.200 0.132 0.182 0.091 0.237
(0.80) (1.14) (1.14) (1.08) (0.61) (1.24)
chair 0.015 0.183** 0.026 0.168* 0.095 0.281***
(0.18) (2.15) (0.34) (1.96) (1.05) (2.70)
ceo 0.203*** 0.017 0.184*** 0.028 0.214** 0.009
(2.86) (0.19) (2.63) (0.30) (2.54) (0.09)
regulate 0.193 0.068 0.250 0.088 0.290 0.229*
(1.11) (0.56) (1.43) (0.73) (1.45) (1.65)
middle 0.182* 0.186* 0.176* 0.209* 0.220* 0.312***
(1.78) (1.68) (1.71) (1.94) (1.94) (2.65)
west 0.544*** 0.243* 0.530*** 0.237* 0.563*** 0.307**
(4.57) (1.72) (4.77) (1.73) (4.27) (2.04)
Constant 5.550*** 5.657*** 6.282*** 6.720*** 6.841*** 9.668***
(3.96) (3.37) (4.69) (4.26) (4.49) (5.18)
N 614 532 614 534 614 534
Adj. R2 0.355 0.332 0.319 0.298 0.276 0.213
F 169.124 24.797 19.388 20.962 15.313 25.777
F-test 322.14 110.67 9.07
p-Value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0027
Note: D is a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 for PCFV or assigned the value of 0 for LCFV.
t statistics are in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
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5.4.1. Robustness test on the relationship between executive compensation and CFV
We use the compensation of the chairman (lnchair), CEO (lnceo), CFO (lncfo) and the total of these three
(lnchair_ceo_cfo) as executive compensation variables to re-test Hypothesis 1. The results are shown in
Table 9.
Table 11
Robustness test on whether managerial power inﬂuences the stickiness of executive compensation.
lntm lncomp lndir
power = 1 power = 0 power = 1 power = 0 power = 1 power = 0
fair_value 0.815 0.403*** 0.581 0.456*** 0.779 1.219***
(0.64) (3.39) (0.47) (3.98) (0.62) (8.29)
oper_inco 0.382* 0.038*** 0.392* 0.047*** 0.419 0.053***
(1.66) (14.43) (1.67) (16.18) (1.34) (16.38)
dum 0.036 0.013 0.024 0.019 0.048 0.046
(0.42) (0.27) (0.28) (0.40) (0.50) (0.74)
dum*fair_value 7.575*** 2.131* 6.039** 1.173 2.244 0.439
(2.66) (1.78) (2.12) (1.02) (0.66) (0.33)
board 0.019 0.010 0.045 0.009 0.061* 0.028
(0.71) (0.75) (1.63) (0.64) (1.96) (1.59)
inde_dir 2.971*** 0.010 2.970*** 0.241 1.559 0.282
(4.17) (0.03) (3.60) (0.60) (1.50) (0.57)
lnsale 0.264*** 0.182*** 0.267*** 0.175*** 0.296*** 0.185***
(6.84) (10.32) (6.76) (9.04) (5.96) (7.29)
salegrowth 0.009 0.000 0.009* 0.000 0.017** 0.000
(1.56) (0.67) (1.66) (1.10) (2.46) (1.01)
leverage 0.333* 0.001 0.485*** 0.014*** 0.439** 0.015***
(1.77) (0.59) (2.78) (8.29) (2.19) (6.98)
adj_return 0.021 0.014 0.032 0.007 0.007 0.015
(0.52) (0.51) (0.78) (0.25) (0.15) (0.36)
lnaver_inco 0.406** 0.317** 0.295 0.264** 0.033 0.093
(2.00) (2.55) (1.45) (2.21) (0.14) (0.66)
soe 0.091 0.045 0.012 0.079 0.096 0.208***
(0.97) (0.89) (0.13) (1.50) (0.88) (3.38)
comp_com 0.304 0.194* 0.313 0.190* 0.349 0.239*
(1.43) (1.79) (1.39) (1.88) (1.39) (1.74)
cross 0.304 0.261** 0.268 0.254** 0.200 0.245*
(1.56) (2.23) (1.32) (2.20) (0.97) (1.76)
chair 0.065 0.099 0.066 0.122* 0.127 0.183**
(0.49) (1.51) (0.61) (1.82) (0.92) (2.26)
ceo 0.228** 0.058 0.200* 0.038 0.241* 0.057
(2.03) (0.88) (1.87) (0.58) (1.81) (0.71)
regulate 0.061 0.135 0.116 0.153 0.267 0.233*
(0.28) (1.24) (0.50) (1.43) (0.95) (1.88)
middle 0.173 0.195** 0.137 0.217** 0.209 0.283***
(1.14) (2.26) (0.91) (2.57) (1.25) (2.97)
west 0.473** 0.360*** 0.405** 0.353*** 0.597*** 0.356***
(2.18) (3.52) (2.28) (3.46) (2.82) (3.14)
Constant 3.035 6.441*** 4.018* 7.267*** 6.815** 8.525***
(1.36) (5.27) (1.78) (6.33) (2.58) (6.36)
N 279 867 279 869 279 869
Adj. R2 0.426 0.310 0.432 0.274 0.392 0.199
F 11.317 128.312 10.914 32.266 9.956 29.201
F-test 20.65 17.91 4.11
p-Value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0428
Note: t statistics are in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
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niﬁcantly positively related to CFV. The results are consistent with the conclusions of Zhou et al. (2010).99 Zhou et al. (2010) ﬁnd that the CEO and chairman are not responsible for CFV and their compensation has no signiﬁcant relationship
with CFV. The CFO, however, is in charge of capital operations, and this oﬃcer’s compensation is signiﬁcantly related to CFV.
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We divide the sample into two sub-groups: one group comprises companies earning PCFV (D = 1), and the
other comprises companies suﬀering LCFV (D = 0). We then conduct an F-test to examine Hypothesis 2, by
testing the diﬀerence in the coeﬃcients of fair_value between the two groups. The robustness results shown in
Table 10 remain unchanged compared with those of Table 7.
5.4.3. Robustness test on whether managerial power inﬂuences the stickiness of executive compensation
We further categorize the sample into two sub-groups according to managerial power, one group compris-
ing companies with strong managerial power (power = 1) and the other group comprising companies with
weak managerial power (power = 0). We conduct an F-test to verify Hypothesis 3 by testing the diﬀerence
in the coeﬃcient for dum  fair_value between the two groups and ﬁnd that the results remain unchanged
(see Table 11).
5.4.4. Eliminating the eﬀects of the ﬁnancial crisis
In 2008, domestic companies suﬀered severely from the global ﬁnancial crisis. Taking into consideration the
noise caused by this crisis on the value relevance of ﬁnancial reports, earnings management and accounting
conservatism, we drop the observations from 2008 and test the three hypotheses again. The results remain lar-
gely unchanged.
5.4.5. Eliminating cross-listed companies
Zhang (2011) ﬁnds that the sensitivity of compensation in cross-listed companies is signiﬁcantly higher than
that in mainland-listed companies. Therefore, we remove 72 cross-listed companies from the sample and test
the three hypotheses again. The results remain largely unchanged.
6. Conclusions and limitations
6.1. Conclusions
Examining A-share listed companies on the Shanghai Securities Exchange and Shenzhen Securities
Exchange from 2007 to 2009, we test the sensitivity of executive compensation to CFV. We draw the following
conclusions: (1) CFV is positively related to executive compensation, and (2) the sensitivity of executive com-
pensation is asymmetric to CFV. That is, executive pay rises higher due to PCFV than it declines due to
LCFV. Further examination reveals that the greater the degree of managerial power, the more asymmetric
the sensitivity of executive compensation is to CFV. These ﬁndings suggest the following policy implications.
With the implementation of the new accounting standards, changes in accounting measurement attributes
have inﬂuenced the levels of executive compensation. The eﬀects of CFV on executive compensation should
therefore be considered in the design of compensation contracts and changes in fair value that come from
management eﬀort, from opportunism or from changes in the market environment should be reasonably
distinguished.
This study oﬀers some insights into the motives and methods of compensation manipulation using CFV. It
suggests that in the design of compensation contracts, more attention should be paid to the dangers of man-
agement opportunism. The role that CFV plays in the compensation contract should be cautiously balanced.
If corporate governance and internal control mechanisms are perfected and the power of management to
manipulate compensation is suppressed, then compensation contracts based on performance will function bet-
ter and a rational compensation system may truly come into being.
6.2. Limitations
Despite its potential contributions, our study also has several limitations, which suggest possible directions
for further research.
We excluded observations in which CFV was reported as 0 in annual reports, which may have led to bias in
sample selection, thus limiting the generalizability of our conclusions.
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tenure, which are probably insuﬃcient to accurately measure the real conditions of managerial power in Chi-
nese listed companies.
We ignore perks in the calculation of executive compensation. Perks are common and even a major com-
ponent of compensation in listed Chinese companies, especially in SOEs. Chen et al. (2005) ﬁnd that perks are
a substitute for bonuses for SOE managers who are under compensation regulation. Excluding perks from
executive compensation may inﬂuence the results.
The eﬀect of earnings management on CFV is also beyond our consideration. Ye et al. (2009) ﬁnd that man-
agers commonly recognize a large proportion of corporate ﬁnancial assets as available for sale to reduce the
eﬀect of CFV on their income statements. In that case, it becomes diﬃcult to account for managements’ real
intentions in holding ﬁnancial assets and this factor may have aﬀected our results.
Our study provides evidence on the sensitivity of executive compensation to CFV. In practice, however,
there are many other factors that may aﬀect executive compensation. Better handling of these issues will
involve a complex process of developing standards, dealing with competing interests in the process of making
contracts and better implementation and re-evaluation of compensation contracts.
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